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ABSTRACT
This paper analyses the management of the Atlantic salmon stocks in the Baltic Sea through a coalition
game in partition function form. The signs of economic and biological over-exploitation of these salmon
stocks over the last two decades indicate that cooperation among the harvesting countries, under the
European Union's Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), has been ostensible. Combining a two-stage game of
four asymmetric players with a disaggregated bioeconomic model, we conclude that cooperation under
the present Relative Stability Principle (RSP) is not a stable outcome. In contrast, the equilibrium of the
game is full non-cooperation. The paper also addresses the possibility of enhancing cooperation through
more  flexible  fishing  strategies.  The  results  indicate  that  partial  cooperation  is  stable  under  specific
sharing  schemes.  It  is  also  shown  that  substantial  economic  benefits  could  have  been  realised  by
reallocating the fishing effort, without compromising stock sustainability.
Keywords: partition function, coalition formation, sharing rules, stability analysis, bioeconomic model,
Atlantic salmon
INTRODUCTION
The Atlantic salmon of the Baltic Sea is a valuable resource shared by several coastal states. Damming,
pollution, overfishing and changes in the Baltic Sea ecosystem have caused a serious decline in the wild,
naturally reproducing, salmon stocks. Therefore, in 1997 the now defunct International Baltic Sea Fishery
Commission (IBSFC) launched the Baltic Salmon Action Plan (SAP) that aimed to recover wild Baltic
salmon stocks. The goal was to reach 50 % of estimated smolt production capacity by 2010. Presently it is
expected that only some of the more productive salmon stocks will reach this goal. Futhermore, as the
political situation in the region changed after the last enlargement of the EU, the European Commission
decided to revise the SAP in 2008 and to develop a new management framework for Baltic salmon [1].
The present reproduction areas of this anadromous species are mainly located in Finland and Sweden. In
addition to these two countries, during its feeding and spawning migrations, salmon is harvested mainly
by Denmark and Poland. The salmon fishery in the Baltic Sea is regulated by the European Union's
Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) that determines each country’ s total allowable catch (TAC). Added to
this, each country has its own regulations, for instance regarding the length of the fishing season.
The salmon TAC in the Baltic Sea region is shared among the EU countries according to the Relative
Stability Principle (RSP) (EEC Reg. no. 172/83) that assures to each member state a fixed percentage of
the  catch  volume  yearly  available.  The  total  TAC  is  a  result  from  the  political  decisions  based  on
scientific salmon stock assessment. Based on the RSP each member state knows the total TAC level
required to maintain its TAC high enough (see e.g.[2]). Consequently, member states have an incentive to
"talk up" the total TAC. Such a situation is called decision-overfishing [3].
Salmon catches in the Baltic Sea have declined since 1990 from 5.600 tonnes in 1990 to 1.275 tonnes in
2006, which was the lowest registered catch since 1970 [4]. Despite the decline in the catches, the TACIIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings
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has been set so high that it does not restrict the fishery. Since early 1990's, the reported salmon catches
have been near 70% of the TAC (see e.g [3]). Further, the number of fishing vessels in the offshore
salmon fishery has decreased from 316 vessels in 1996 to 98 vessels in 2006 [4]. Consequently, CFP
appears to have failed in its objectives to maintain sustainable salmon stocks and economically viable
fishing industries. This seems to happen despite the enormous number of biological (see e.g [5,6]) and
management  related  studies  (see  e.g.;[7-9]  on  the  Baltic  salmon.  Studies  addressing  the  economic
dimensions of the Baltic salmon fisheries are, however, scarce. [10-12] studied the optimal harvest of
salmon from the Finnish point of view and [13] expanded the focus to internationally optimal harvest.
The poor state of the salmon stocks in the Baltic Sea and the low catches compared to the TACs, raise a
fundamental question: does a real cooperative management of the species exists? To answer this question
we construct a bioeconomic model and analyse strategic interactions between the fishing states through a
coalition formation model.
The earlier studies on the cooperative management of the migrating fish stocks have used characteristic
function (C-function) games to address the sharing of cooperative surplus (see e.g. [14-16]. Recently,
games in the partition function (P-function) form have been introduced in the fisheries literature [17,18].
P-function games are able to analyse potential externalities of coalition formation, i.e. the effects that
mergers produce on the non-merging players. These effects are assumed to be absent in the case of C-
function games. Fishery games generally exhibit positive externalities, that is, when some fishing states
join together in a coalition the other states benefit from it. This generally occurs as the coalition tends to
reduce its fishing effort in order to better manage and safeguard the fish stock. The states outside the
coalition benefit from those efforts, through an increase in stock availability. In this context, free rider
incentives tend to be present and therefore the grand-coalition is rarely an equilibrium outcome [19].
We apply a P-function approach to assess the equilibrium of the Salmon fishery in the Baltic Sea and
confront it with the past and present status of the fishery. The coalition formation is modelled as a single-
coalition and open-membership game [20], based on a fairly disaggregated bioeconomic [13].This paper
fills a gap in the literature by providing an empirical application of coalition formation in fisheries. In
particular,  it  is  directly  related  to  previous  theoretical  studies  such  as  [21,22].  The  former  analyses
coalition formation in fisheries using the classical Gordon-Schaefer bioeconomic modelling [23,24]. The
latter  proposes  a  sharing  scheme  to  distribute  the  gains  from  cooperation  in  coalition  games  with
externalities.. Further, the present paper addresses the following question raised by [25]: "As hard as the
analysis may be the heterogeneity of players raises the interesting and important issue of the composition
of coalitions: Do coalitions in a stable coalition structure [...] consists of similar players or dissimilar
players or both?”  Due to the migration pattern of salmon, the catch of different countries has a different
effect on different salmon stocks. Consequently, our detailed analysis of potentially stable coalitions will
give insights into the planning and implementation of the forthcoming SAP. For instance, what are the
potential socio-economic and biological effects of a management system where the feeding salmon in the
Baltic Main Basin is regulated separately from the spawning migrating salmon in the Gulf of Bothnia?
BIOECONOMIC MODEL
The underlying bioeconomic simulation model on which we base our coalition game follows [13]. The
model considers four fishing states controlling on near 80% of the TAC and catching 90% of the annual
salmon catch: Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Poland, which differ among other things in terms of the
structure of the salmon fleet, fishing costs and salmon price. We review shortly this highly disaggregate
and sequential model in those parts that are necessary to understand the present analysis and results.
The underlying population model is used by the Baltic Salmon and Trout Assessment Working Group
(WGBAST) to assess the status of the salmon stocks  and to provide  management  recommendations
[4,26]. Figure 1 illustrates the population dynamics and the sequential fishery. The adult salmon recruit
mainly to the fishery during its feeding migration to the Baltic Main Basin. There, salmon is harvested by
offshore driftnets  and  longlines  which  we denote by  ODN and OLL,  respectively. All four  countriesIIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings
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participate in these fisheries. The offshore fisheries take place in the winter time and by assumption the
offshore driftnet fishery harvest in October and the longliners in December. In the spring time, the mature
salmon start their spawning migration towards their home rivers. Then, the homing fish are harvested by
coastal driftnet (CDN), coastal trapnet (CTN) and coastal gilnet (CGN) fisheries in the Bothnian Sea and
in the Bothnian Bay. Finland and Sweden are the only countries participating in the coastal fisheries.
Finally, the salmon is harvested by river fisheries, which are mainly recreational. The present analysis
exclude the value of the recreational catch, however the model accounts for the effect of the river fisheries
on the salmon stocks.
The population dynamics model considers the life-history of 15 naturally reproducing salmon stocks, two
of which locate in Finland and the remainder in Sweden. The migration route of salmon is dependent on
the location of their home rivers. Therefore, it affects the stock available for each geartype and country.
Further, the model considers the life-cycle of hatchery-reared salmon and its contribution to the salmon
catches. These facts are encompassed on the economic part of the model that assesses each country's net
present value from the fishery. The model considers years 1995-2005. Thus, it allows us to compare the
real performance of the fishery with those that could have occurred under alternative economically sound
fishing policies.
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Fig. 1. Schematic presentation of the bioeconomic model.
THE GAME
In  this  section  we  define  a  two-stage  partition  function  game  in  order  to  understand  the  strategic
interaction between the countries. As referred, all four countries are members of the European Union and
they operate under the Common Fisheries Policy. However, something in the TAC negotiations does not
fit the picture, since the TAC has been higher than reported catches and, most importantly, the salmon
stocks have decreased.IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings
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Coalition Formation Model
We study the coalition formation in the salmon fishery by applying the simultaneous-move and open-
membership game. For instance, [17,21] have adopted the same approach in addressing straddling fish
stocks. The game consists of two stages. In the first, players decide whether to behave as singletons or to
join a coalition. We adopt the assumption of only one non-trivial (non-singleton) coalition (see e.g.[22]).
Therefore, each player can only choose to play as singleton or to join the coalition. In the second stage,
singleton(s) and coalition play non-cooperatively by choosing the fishing effort strategies that maximise
their payoffs, given the behaviour of the others. The game is solved by backward induction for the Nash
equilibrium coalition structure.
Partition Function
Throughout  the paper we follow  the definitions and  notation of  [22]. We denote our coalition  game
between the n (= 4) players by ( ) , N p G . A coalition S is defined as a subset of the set of players
{ } 1,..., Nn =  and the set of all possible coalitions of N is represented by 2
N. However, we restrict our
analysis  to  coalition  structures  consisting  of  only  one  non-trivial  coalition  S  while  all  other  players
\ j NS ˛ are singletons. This approach is, therefore, a special case of the general definition of partition
functions defined for instance by [27]. Consequently, each country can only be in the coalition or outside
it. Therefore, each coalition structure is fully characterized by coalition S. We define a restricted partition
function p  that assigns a single real number ( ) S S p  to coalition S and real numbers ( ) j S p to each
singleton coalition as:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) 1 : ,     with    \ .
ns
Sj S S S S j NS p p pp
+- = ˛˛ a¡ (Eq.1)
The domain of the restricted partition function is the power set of ( ) 2
N N  i.e. the partition function takes
this set as input. The image of this mapping is a vector with variable size, ( ) ( ) 1 ns +-  where s is the
number of players in the coalition (cardinality of coalition S).
Since we are interested in analysing the players' incentives to form coalitions, we need to define how each
player values the coalitions. Therefore, we define a valuation function v to each coalition that prescribes
how the worth of coalition  S is allocated among its  members. A  valuation  function assigns to  every
coalition S  of N  a real-valued vector of length n , ( ) : 2:
Nn v S vS ﬁ ¡a , such that:
( ) ( )
() ()               \ .
iS iS
jj
v SS
v S S j NS
p
p
˛ ￿ = ￿
￿
= "˛ ￿ ￿
￿
(Eq.2)
Valuations ( ) i vS satisfies group rationality, meaning that the entire worth of coalition S,( ) S S p , is
allocated to its members. For each singleton, the valuation ( ) j vS coincides with the worth ( ) j S p that is
assigned to the singletons by the partition function. As equation (2) shows the valuation specifies the
payoff for the coalition members and the singletons and does this for all possible coalitions. Therefore,
each player is able to evaluate its gains from each coalition structure. Consequently, valuations fix the
sharing rule of the cooperative surplus.
Let  us  now  define  formally  the  concepts  of  positive  externalities  and  superadditivity  and  global
efficiency. A coalition game ( ) , N p G  exhibits positive externalities if and only if its partition functionIIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings
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p satisfies: ( ) {} ( ) , , : \. jj SNji jS S S i pp " ˝ " „ ˇ‡
ii Positive externalities imply that the remaining
singletons do not lose when coalitions merge.
A  coalition  game ( ) , N p G is  superadditive  if  and  only  if  its  partition  function p satisfies:
( ) {} {} ( ) {} ( ) \ , : \ \. Si Si S N iS S Si Si p pp " ˝ " ˛ ‡+   Superadditivity implies that that the value of the
coalition must be at least as the value of the coalition when one player deviates plus the payoff of the
deviator  after  deviation.  Thus, superadditivity  implies  that  a  merger  does  not  decrease  the aggregate
welfare of the merging players.
Finally, we say that a coalition game ( ) , N p G is globally efficient if and only if:
{} ( ) {} ( ) {} ( ) ( ) ( ) \\ , \ :. S j Sj j N S i j NS S N i N S S i S i SS p p pp
˛ ¨˛ " ￿ " ˛ ¨ + ¨ ‡+ ￿￿   As  proved  by
Bloch  (2003), if a partition function  is  superadditive the grand coalition  is  always the most efficient
coalition structure.  However, if the game is both superadditive and exhibits positive externalities, the
grand coalition may not be stable. That happens if the free rider incentives due to the positive externalities
exceed the superadditivity effect.
Stability Concept
We adopt the definition for stable coalition due to [20]. According to it coalition S is considered to be
stable with respect to the valuations ( ) vS if and only if S is both internally and externally stable. A
coalition game ( ) , N p G  is internally stable (IS) if and only if: ( ) {} ( ) : \. ii i SvS vSi " ˛‡  Internal
stability  implies  that  no  coalition  member  finds  it  optimal  to  leave  the  coalition
iii.  A  coalition  game
( ) , N p G  is externally stable (ES) if and only if: ( ) { } ( ) \ :. jj j N S v S v Sj " ˛ ‡¨  External stability
(ES) implies that no singleton finds it optimal to join the coalition. As defined earlier, the valuation
function specifies how the worth of coalition S  is allocated among its members. Therefore, as there are
several valuation functions that can be derived from a single partition function, a coalition S  may be
stable with respect to a particular valuation function but not be with respect to another.
RESTRICTED EFFORT STRATEGIES
The present section presents the preliminary results
iv of the game that is constructed to reflect fisheries
policy under the Relative Stability Principle (RSP). The objective of the coalition members is to maximise
the sum of their net present value (NPV) from the salmon fishery given that the players outside the
coalition also maximize their NPV. The maximisation of the coalition is however constrained by the
restriction that all coalition members harvest and they adopt the same proportional change to the fishing
efforts reported in the period 1995-2005 [4] .Throughout the paper, it is assumed that the strategy space of
each country is bounded below by zero and upper by the fishing strategy that the country would adopt if it
were the sole exploiter of the stock (see e.g.[28]).We denote the reported fishing effort of country , n  in
year , t  by ,
rep
nt E . The strategy of country n is defined as:
,
,
,, , 0,
nt
nt
nt nt n rep
E
X XX
E
Øø =˛ ºß , where n X is the
upper bound of the strategy space.
Table 2 illustrates the partition function ( ) S p  and valuation function ( ) vS for each coalition structure.
The  partition  function  assigns  a  value  for  the  coalition ( ) S S p   and  for  the  singleton  coalitionIIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings
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( ),\ j S j NS p "˛  and the valuation function prescribes how the worth of coalition is allocated among its
members. Except for the singleton coalition and the full cooperative coalition structure, the value of the
coalition ( ) S S p  and its allocation ( ), i v S iS "˛  is shown in shaded. The results show that the merger
of coalitions generally increases the payoff of the non-merging players, for example when Finland and
Sweden form a coalition (2) the payoffs of Denmark and Poland increases. However, this does not occur
for all coalition  structures and  therefore game  as a whole does  not  exhibit positive externalities. For
instance, a coalition of Finland and Denmark (3) would decrease the payoffs of Sweden and Poland. This
is due to the restriction according to which each member of the coalition harvests.  In the non-cooperative
case (1) it is optimal for Denmark not to harvest, however under restricted strategies it will harvest when
it forms a coalition with Finland. This causes a decline in the salmon available to the rest of the countries.
Further, the results show that the game is not superadditive. That can be easily verified for instance by
looking at coalition structure 8, where Finland, Sweden and Denmark form a coalition and Poland is a
singleton. The value of the three player coalition is ( ) 926 S p =  and if, for instance, Finland deviates the
value of the coalition becomes {} {} ( ) \1 \ 1 106 S S p = and the payoff of Finland {} ( ) 1 \ 1 965 S p = . This
contradicts the definition for superadditivity since 926 1071 < . Further, although the merger of coalitions
generally increases the aggregate payoff there are exceptions. Thus, the game is also not globally
efficient. For instance, if Denmark would join the coalition between Finland and Sweden the aggregate
payoff would decrease (see coalitions 2 and 8).
Finally, the stability analysis shows that cooperation among the four countries cannot be stable, since the
free rider benefits exceed the aggregate value of the grand coalition. Furthermore, the only stable
coalition structure is full non-cooperation, where all the players are singletons. These results help to
explain why the cooperation among the fishing states, under the auspices of the European Union, seems to
be trivial. In the next section, we assess the prospects of effective cooperation under more flexible fishing
strategies.
Table II. Partition and value functions in thousand's of euro's (t€) for the proportional sharesstrategies.
Coalition (S) Finland Sweden Denmark Poland
1 2 3 4 total IS ES
strategy 0.3 0.4 0 4.2 4.9
v(S) 919 165 0 539 1623
1 (1),(2),(3),(4) ʌ(S) 919 165 0 539 1623 yes yes
strategy 0.3 0.3 0.1 4.2 4.9
v(S) 942 138 0.8 545 1626
2 (1,2), (3), (4) ʌ(S) 1080 0.8 545 1626 no no
strategy 0.3 0.3 0.3 4.2 5.1
v(S) 817 98 -18 499 1396
3 (1,3), (2), (4) ʌ(S) 799 98 499 1396 no no
strategy 0.3 0.7 0.8 0.3 2.1
v(S) 1184 547 248 57 2036
4 (1,4), (2), (3) ʌ(S) 1241 547 248 2036 no yes
strategy 0.3 0.2 0.2 4.2 4.9
v(S) 965 102 3 551 1622
5 (2,3), (1), (4) ʌ(S) 965 106 551 1622 no yes
strategy 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.6 2.3
v(S) 1263 415 177 107 1962
6 (2,4), (1), (3) ʌ(S) 1263 522 177 1962 no no
strategy 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.6 2.2 7 (3,4), (1), (2)
v(S) 1351 459 174 111 2095
no noIIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings
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ʌ(S) 1351 459 286 2095
strategy 0.2 0.2 0.2 4.5 5.1
v(S) 801 118 7 605 1531
8 (1,2,3), (4) ʌ(S) 926 605 1531 no yes
strategy 0.3 0.3 1 0.3 1.9
v(S) 1428 345 427 63 2263
9 (1,2,4), (3) ʌ(S) 1835 427 2263 no yes
strategy 0.3 0.8 0.3 0.3 1.7
v(S) 1450 831 138 65 2483
10 (1,3,4), (2) ʌ(S) 1652 831 2483 no yes
strategy 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.6 2.2
v(S) 1351 459 224 111 2145
11 (2,3,4), (1) ʌ(S) 1351 794 2145 no no
strategy 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 1.2
v(S) 1999 531 219 78 2827
12 (1,2,3,4) ʌ(S) 2827 2827 no yes
OPTIMAL EFFORT STRATEGIES
The present section presents the preliminary results of the game in which each coalition adopts optimal
fishing efforts for its members. Table 3 presents the partition function of the game. As expected, the
coalition payoffs ( ) S S p , shown in shaded, have increased relative to the previous scenario, whereas the
outcome of the full non-cooperation remained unchanged. Here the most efficient member is the only
harvesting  country  in  all  other  non-trivial  coalitions,  except  the  grand  coalition,  where  Finland  and
Sweden  harvest  jointly.  Further,  the  aggregated  value  of  all  coalition  structures  increases,  with  the
exception of (1) and  (7) . The results show that the game exhibits positive externalities and global
efficiency but not supperaditivity. Let us now study the conditions under which a coalition that yields
higher aggregate payoffs than full non-cooperation would be stabilized. Within the coalition formation
game a natural starting point is to look at the conditions under which a member would not find it optimal
to leave the coalition. We follow [22]and define that a coalition S is potentially internally stable (PIS) for
partition function p if and only if: ( ) {} ( ) \, S iS S Si p
˛ ‡￿  i.e. the value of the coalition is at least equal
to the sum of the free rider payoffs. The free-rider payoff is defined as the payoffs of a coalition member
that leaves it to become a singleton, holding the rest of the coalition structure unchanged. Table 3 shows
that the present game has six potentially internally stable coalitions, The two three-player-coalitions (8
and 10) are the most interesting cases, since the two-player-coalitions (3, 5 and 7) are neutral in terms of
the coalitional benefits, when compared to full non-cooperation,. Further, the outcomes of the two PIS
three-player coalitions are significantly different in terms of the aggregate payoff; .Finally, it is important
to note that the full cooperation among the four countries is not PIS since the sum of the free rider payoffs
4118 t€  exceeds the aggregate worth of the coalition 3299 t€ .
Table III. Partition  function in thousand's of euro's (t€ )  for the optimal strategies scenario.
Coalition(S) Finland Sweden Denmark Poland
1 2 3 4 total PIS
strategy 0.3 0.4 0 4.2
1 (1),(2),(3),(4) ʌ(S) 919 165 0 539 1623 yes
strategy 0.3 0.0 0.2 4.5
2 (1,2), (3), (4) ʌ(S) 1067 10 614 1691 no
strategy 0.3 0.4 0 4.2
3 (1,3), (2), (4) ʌ(S) 919 165 539 1623 yes
4 (1,4), (2), (3) strategy 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.0 noIIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings
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ʌ(S) 1399 500 271 2170
strategy 0.3 0.4 0 4.2
5 (2,3), (1), (4) ʌ(S) 919 165 539 1623 yes
strategy 0.4 0.6 0.8 0
6 (2,4), (1), (3) ʌ(S) 1399 500 271 2170 no
strategy 0.3 0.4 0 4.2
7 (3,4), (1), (2) ʌ(S) 919 165 539 1623 yes
strategy 0.3 0 0 4.5
8 (1,2,3) (4) ʌ(S) 1204 666 1870 yes
strategy 0.4 0 1.2 0
9 (1,2,4) (3) ʌ(S) 1788 575 2362 no
strategy 0.4 0.8 0 0
10 (1,3,4) (2) ʌ(S) 1911 966 2876 yes
strategy 0.4 0.8 0 0
11 (2,3,4) (1) ʌ(S) 1911 966 2876 no
strategy 0.5 0.1 0 0
12 (1,2,3,4) ʌ(S) 3299 3299 no
Next we study how the coalition surplus, ( ) ( ) {} ( ) \ Si
iS
S S Si s pp
˛
=- ￿ , should be shared among the
coalition members in order to stabilize the potentially internally stable coalitions. We consider three
different sharing rules: the Almost Ideal Sharing Scheme (AISS) suggested by [22] the Nash Bargaining
solution and the Shapley value
v. We start by defining the three concepts. Recall, that a valuation function
specifies how the worth of a coalition is allocated among its members. Consequently, for each valuation
corresponds a unique sharing rule. First,  we define the Almost  Ideal Valuation Function  (AIVF) for
coalition game ( ) , N p G  as a valuation function ( ) AIVF v
l  that satisfies:
()() {} ( ) ()()
()() ()
:\
:
\:
AIVF
i ii
AIVF
jj
i S v S S i SS
SN
j N S vSS
l
l
p ls
p
￿ " ˛ =+ ￿ "˝ ￿
" ˛= ￿ ￿
with () { }
1 |1
ss
j jS S l ll
-
+ ˛ ˛ D = ˛= ￿ ¡ ,where
1 s- D denotes the set of all possible sharing weights of
a coalition with s   players, and ( ) S s  the coalition surplus, which can be positive, negative or nil.
Consequently, an AIVF allocates to each coalition member its free-rider payoff plus some share, ( ) S l ,
of the surplus. [29]developed a similar kind of sharing rule called "Satisfactory Nucleolus" for the C-
function game.
Table 4 presents the stability analysis of the present game under the three sharing rules. We illustrate the
AISS by using equal weights i.e. ()
1
, ,. i S S NiS
s
l = " ˝ "˛  [22] showed that the AISS stabilizes the
PIS coalition that has the highest aggregate worth and therefore the sharing scheme can be regarded as
optimal. Further, they showed that this result is robust with respect to the surplus allocation i.e. it does not
depend  on  the  sharing  weights.  Table  4  shows  that  AISS  stabilizes  the  coalition  between  Finland,
Denmark and Poland (10) which is the one that yields the highest aggregate payoff among those that are
PIS.The  Nash  Bargaining  solution  presented  in  the  Table  4  is  computed  as  follows:
( ) {} ( ) ( ) {} ( ) ,
N a s hB
i i i Si iS v S i Si p l pp
-
˛ Øø = +- ºß ￿ where {} ( ) i i p is the payoff of the player i underIIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings
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full  non-cooperation  and ( ) i S l satisfies:
1
, :. i S NiS
s
l " ˝ " ˛=   Consequently,  the  difference
between  AISS  and  Nash  Bargaining  solution  is  that  on  the  former  the  threat  points  depends  on  the
coalition structure, whereas on the latter they are fixed and equal to the payoffs when all players are
singletons.  The results show that the Nash Bargaining solution is only able to stabilize the case of full
non-cooperation.
The  modified  Shapley  value  is  calculated  according  to  the  formula:
() [ ] [ ] () {} {} ( ) \
1 !!
\,
!
Shap
iT Ti
TS
t st
v S T Ti iS
s
pp
˝
-- Øø = - "˛ ºß ￿ where sS =   is the cardinality of the
coalition S and similarly tT =  is the cardinality of the subset TS ˝ . The Shapley value assigns to each
coalition member its average contribution to every possible subcoalition T of S. Table 4 shows that the
Shapley  value  stabilizes  full  non-cooperation  and  the  coalition  structure  number  5,  whose  outcome
coincides  with  that  of  full  non-cooperation.  Consequently,  the  results  are  in  line  with  other  studies
focusing on the coalition formation with positive externalities [22,29] that showed the existence of other
sharing rules that stabilize coalition structures with higher aggregate payoff than those corresponding to
the Nash bargaining solution and the Shapley value.
Table IV. Valuation functions for the optimal effort strategies with three sharing rules.
Coalition(S) AISS Nash Bargaining Shapley Value
1 2 3 4 IS  ES 2 3 4 IS  ES 1 2 3 4 IS  ES
share yes yes yes yes yes yes
1 (1),(2),(3),(4) v(S) 919  165 0  539 919  165 0  539    919  165 0  539
share 0,85 0,15    no yes 0,85 0,15    no no 0,85 0,15    no no
2 (1,2), (3), (4) v(S) 910 157 10  614 910 157 10  614 910 157 10  614
Share 1 0   yes no 1 0   yes no 1 0   yes no
3 (1,3), (2), (4) v(S) 919  165 0  539 919  165 0  539 919  165 0  539
share 0,64 0,36 no no 0,64 0,36 no no 0,64 0,36 no no
4 (1,4), (2), (3) v(S) 890  500271 509 890  500271 509 890  500271 509
share 1 0 yes yes 1 0    yes no 1 0 yes yes
5 (2,3), (1), (4) v(S) 919 165 0  539 919 165 0  539    919 165 0  539
share 0,13 0,87 no yes 0,13 0,87 no yes 0,13 0,87 no no
6 (2,4), (1), (3) v(S) 1399 63  271437       1399 63  271437    139963  271437
share 0 1  yesno 0 1  yesno 0 1  yes no
7 (3,4), (1), (2) v(S) 919  165 0 539       919  165 0 539    919  165 0 539
share 0,79 0,17 0,04 yes yes 0,80 0,17 0,03 yes no 0,31 0,31 0,38 no no
8 (1,2,3), (4) v(S) 955 202 47  666 959 205 40  666 372 372 460 666
share 0,65 0,14 0,21 no yes 0,54 0,12 0,33 no yes 0,67 0,23 0,10 no no
9 (1,2,4), (3) v(S) 1157 258 575 372 974 220 575 593 1195 407 575 185
share 0,51 0,17 0,21 yes yes 0,56 0,08 0,36 no yes 0,31 0,38 0,31 no yes
10 (1,3,4), (2) v(S) 979  966332 599 1070 966 151 690 596  966719 596
share 0,17 0,28 0,55 no yes 0,26 0,09 0,65 no yes 0,20 0,59 0,20 no yes
11 (2,3,4), (1) v(S) 1911 162 268 535       1911 253 87 626    1911 197 572 197
share 0,52 0,23 0,11 0,14 no yes 0,41 0,18 0,13 0,29 no yes 0,36 0,17 0,24 0,23 no yes
12 (1,2,3,4) v(S) 1706 761 370 462 1338 584 419 958 1198 545 806 750IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings
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CONCLUSIONS
The Atlantic salmon fishery in the Baltic Sea has shown clear signs of biological and economic over-
exploitation, over the last two decades. Although all the Baltic Sea riparian countries considered are
members  of  the  European  Union  and  agree  on  the  annual  fishing  possibilities  under  the  Common
Fisheries Policy (CFP) the salmon quota has not restricted the fishery. The catches year after year below
TAC suggest that the cooperation under the CFP framework has been trivial.
Using a game in partition function form, we show that, in fact, full cooperation is not a stable outcome, as
the  free  rider  payoffs  exceed  the  payoffs  of  cooperation.  Furthermore,  full  non-cooperation  is  the
equilibrium of the game if the fishing strategies are according with the relative stability principle (RSP).
The results also show that economically sound fisheries policies lead to higher stock levels than the
historical performance of the international salmon fishery.
We also investigate the consequences of relaxing the RSP by allowing each coalition member to adopt its
optimal  strategy. The results  show  that under an appropriate sharing rule,  the AISS, it  is  possible to
achieve a high degree of stable cooperation between the countries, namely three-player coalitions such as
Finland,  Sweden  and  Denmark  or  Finland,  Denmark  and  Poland.  A  change  from  fishing  strategies
accordant with RSP to the optimal fishing strategies, though reducing the number of active harvesting
countries, increases the aggregate payoffs. Further, the sharing rule allocates the payoffs is such as way
that stabilises the coalition to non-harvesting coalition members so that the coalition is stable. Finally, the
model results show that the coalition structure  where Finland, Denmark and Poland form a coalition
yields the highest aggregate payoffs and is  in accordance with the precautionary principle related to
mixed stock fisheries.
The model results are significantly different from those obtained by [21]. Using the classical Gordon-
Schaefer bioeconomic model in a symmetric player setting, the authors concluded that the only stable
coalition structure is the one formed by singletons that is complete non-cooperation. Hence, our results
indicate that by allowing for asymmetric players and considering disaggregated bioeconomic models it is
possible to guarantee higher levels of cooperation. Extending the present empirical model opens several
possibilities for further research, namely the study of the stability of coalitions over time and the role of
uncertainty in coalition formation.
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ENDNOTES
iDo not cite without contacting the first author. The results are preliminary.
ii Eyckmans and Finus (2004) defines positive externalities: ( ) {} ( ) , , :\ jj S N ji jS S Si pp " ˝ " „ ˇ‡
and ( ) {} ( ) , : \. kk ki kS S Si pp $ „ ˇ>  However, their results are robust to our more loose definition
that considers also the neutral effects of coalition formation.
iii Since the paper focus on only one non-trivial coalition, internal stability coincides with the stand alone
stability defined by Yi (1997, p.223).  According to it, a coalition structure is stand-alone stable if no
player finds it optimal to leave its coalition to form a singleton coalition, holding the rest of the coalition
structure constant.
ivDo not cite without contacting the first author. The results are preliminary
v We follow Eyckamns & Finus (2004) and apply the extended versions of the Nash Bargaining and
Shapley value defined by Aumann and Drèze (1974) i.e. we calculate the values for all coalition
structures.